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STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA  
NA-20 BAKER/LOONEY/, NA-20.1 KOONTZ  
NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPOULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS, NA-25  
HUIZENGA/VOLGER, NA-243-GOOREVICH/BRUNNS; NA-241 O'CONNOR,  
LAMONTAGNE  
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A

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SUBJECT: IAEA GIVES SOME INSIGHT INTO THE NEW 2010-2013 NUCLEAR SECURITY PLAN

REF: (A) UNVIE 143 (B) UNVIE 65 (C) UNVIE 74

**11.** (SBU)SUMMARY: The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security (ONS) is making a good faith effort to involve Member States in developing the next Nuclear Security Plan (NSP) for 2010 - 2013. A draft outline discussed initially June 4 and 5 follows the new organization structure ONS put forward in the draft IAEA budget for 2010-2011 (REF A-C). The plan outline has a regional focus; however, it needs to be updated with more detail and emphasis on IAEA's role in nuclear security over the long term. Ambassador conveyed to ONS chief Nilsson and representatives of major donor states June 5 that ONS must define its "niche" in global nuclear security activities with a succinct statement of mission, must build Member State "ownership" of the program by emphasizing its geographic reach, and must make the case for financial resources to retain good staff and sustain their work. End Summary.

**12.** (SBU)On June 5, several key sponsors of the Nuclear Security Fund attended a meeting convened by the Secretariat, to discuss the outline draft of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013. The meeting was chaired by Office of Nuclear Security Director, Anita Nilsson. Nilsson stressed that the plan puts emphasis on the need for a capability to deal with nuclear security at the regional and international levels - not just at the state level - and that it should be a long-term, and not an ad-hoc, effort. Nilsson also underscored the insufficient set of internationally accepted guidelines when it comes to nuclear security. Consistent with the Director General's program and budget proposal for 2010-11, the ONS plan is structured into four program areas: a comprehensive information platform for monitoring and communications; the establishment of global nuclear security regions, an area which also includes R&D; nuclear services packages that follow a modular approach, i.e. can be put together by individual states as they see fit; and risk reduction. The goal of the plan is that ONS can better tailor its services to the circumstances and needs in recipient countries.

U.S. PRIORITIES

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**13.** (SBU)In response to Ms. Nilsson's presentation, Ambassador Schulte identified three prerequisites for the success of the NSP. Firstly, he said ONS had to identify how the IAEA nuclear security program is part of a broader international effort that includes the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and UNSCR 1540, border training through UNODC and the OSCE, and other elements. The IAEA's comparative advantage lay in propagating a global nuclear security culture, including through cooperation in training programs and the issuance of guidance documents, as well as supporting efforts

towards sustainability. Ambassador Schulte stressed that the NSP should not be too ambitious or broad in its aims and that the role of the IAEA should be defined more clearly. He questioned the Agency's need to include security-specific R&D and noted that providing detection equipment was a task that certain Member States were likely to be have vastly more resources for than would the IAEA. Second, he urged member-state ownership beyond the group of donors; and finally, it is important for the IAEA to have resources, in the regular budget, in order to avoid unpredictability.

¶4. (SBU) Ambassador indicated that the NSP should reinforce the message that Nuclear Security is a core function benefitting all Member States. Expanding the sense of program "ownership" beyond major donors to the low-income states (G-77 plus some in Eastern Europe) receiving 75 percent of ONS program activity was crucial. He advocated associating ONS activity with the Global Partnership and emphasizing nuclear security as an essential context and confidence-builder for both disarmament and the expansion of peaceful uses. The plan must reflect that services and benefits are available to all. Thirdly, in terms of the resources, Ambassador cautioned member states that the only way to avoid unpredictability for the plan is through "a real increase in the Agency budget."

#### MEMBER STATES COMMENT ON PRIORITIES AND PLAN STRUCTURE

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¶5. (SBU) Germany expressed its readiness to "fully cooperate" in the development of the NSP. Echoing statements by the U.S., Germany urged that the Secretariat give donors feedback on where their contributions are needed the most. New Zealand stressed that transportation security deserves special attention, and mentioned that the lack of comprehensive inventories of material in some Pacific and Asian countries, for example, can be a hurdle to achieving long-term nuclear security.

¶6. (SBU) The United Kingdom promised more detailed comments once London reviews the document. In the meantime, it proposed that smart indicators be built into the reporting stage of the process, so as to have a clear picture of the progress before the final assessment. The U.S. seconded this recommendation and added that this should also apply to the sustainability aspect of the plan. Likewise, Canada expressed support for the U.S. emphasis on ONS fitting itself into broader international efforts. On format, Canada suggested that the Plan's section C, on drivers, be expanded to include, among others, the international threat environment, and that there be more linkage between sections F, on providing nuclear security, and G, on risk reduction and security improvement.

¶7. (SBU) In reply to Germany's request for more details about the proposed Nuclear Security Support Centers, Nilsson described these as centers of excellence that would fulfill three purposes: technical backup for, among others, instrument maintenance and assistance with readings; coordination of national development of objectives and processes in countries with larger-magnitude programs; and boosting capacity/attaining economies of scale at a regional level in areas such as nuclear forensics for which individual nations may lack means.

#### THE NEXT STEPS

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¶8. (SBU) This meeting was the first IAEA consultation on the NSP. A second informal consultation, based on a more detailed draft plan, is expected to take place at the end of June, after which the Nuclear Security Advisory Group (AdSec) would be extended an invitation to provide input. An open-ended meeting with a larger audience will take place by the end of July. The document presented at that meeting will be a near-final version of the NSP. The final document will be available in the beginning of August, so that it may be discussed in the General Conference.

#### COMMENT

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¶9. (SBU) A more comprehensive NSP should be available within a couple weeks for USG comment. As ONS proceeds in drafting, the Mission will focus on working with ONS to ensure the plan reflects USG priorities and a clearly defined and delimited role for the IAEA

within global nuclear security efforts.

SCHULTE